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[So F. No. 20664. In Bank. May 18, 1961.] 
SILVER HILLS COUNTRY CLUB ct al., Responrlents, V. 
JOHN G. SOBIESKI, as Commissioner of Corporations, 
.\ppr\ll1llt. 
[1] Corporations - Corporate Securities Act - Security. - Corp. 
Code, § 25008, defines a ":-;eeurity" broadly to protect the public 
against spurious schemef', however ingeniously devised, to 
attract risk capital. To effectuate this purpose the courts look 
through form to substance. 
[2] Id. - Corporate Securities Act - Security. - Where the pur-
('hasel' of a lIlelllIJcr"hip in a country club acquires h:\' his plll'-
('ha~e a con!ln('\Hnl ri;.:ht to u~e the duh fa('ilities thnt can tint 
he reyoked except for his own mishehavior or failure to pay 
dues, such an irrevocable right qualifies as a benefieial interest 
in title to pl'operty within the literal language of Corp. Code, 
~ 25008, 5ubd. (a), defining a security. 
[3] Id.-Corporate Securities Act-Security.-A contract provid-
ing only for the sale of services is not within the scope and 
purpo,.;e of the Corporatc Securities Art. 
[4] Id.-Corporate Securities Act-Security.-Generally, the sale 
of "securities" that is condemned by the courts when done 
without a permit involves an attempt by an issuer to raise 
funds for a business venture or ellterprise; an indiscriminate 
o1l'ering to the public at large where the perllons solicited are 
selected at random; n passive position on the part of the in-
vestor: and the conduct of the enterprise by the issuer with 
other people's money. 
[5] Id.-Corporate Securities Act-Secnrity.-Thc Corporate Se-
curities Act extends even to transactions where capital i~ 
plMed without expectntion of material benefits. 
[6] Id.-Corporate Securities Act-Security.--Since the Corporate 
Securities Act floes not make profit to the supplier of capital 
the test of what iR It security, its objective i::; to afford those 
who risk their capital at least It fair chance of realizing their 
ob.iectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect 
a return on their capital in one form or another. 
[7] Id.-Corporate Securities Act-Security.--The Corporate Se-
(~urities Act is as clearly applicable to the slIle of promotional 
[1] What (·onstitutes securities within contemplation of statutes 
regulating ~ale of securities, note, lu3 A.L.R. 1050. See also 
Cal.Jur.2d, f'('l'\lritil'~ Ad,;, § (j . .! et 5('q.; Am.Jur., Securities Acts, 
~ 16 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-7] C"rpol'lltion,.;, § 167(1). 
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m~mberships in a country club, planned for profit and with 
construction finn need by membership sales, as it would be had 
the purcha8ers expected their return in some such familiar 
form as dividends. Otherwise it could too easily be vitiated 
hy inventive substitutes for conventional means of raising risk 
capital. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San I<'rancisco. Orla St. Clair, Judge. 
Reversed. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel the Commissioner of 
Corporations to vacate an order directing petitioners to stop 
the sale of memberships in a country club. Judgment granting 
writ, reversed. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Harold B. Haas and Victor 
Griffith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant. 
Broun & King and LeRoy A. Broun for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioners are partners in a venture to 
organize the Silver Hills Country Club in Marin County and 
to conduct it as a business for profit. In June 1959 they con-
tracted to purchase for $75,000 a 22-acre ranch including a 
10-room house, two smaller houses, a stable, and other im-
provements. The contract of sale provided for a down pay-
ment of $400, a payment of $50,000 18 months from the date 
of the contract, and the payment of $1,000 a month to begin 
three years from the date of the contract. At the time of the 
proceeding below petitioners had paid only the $400 down 
payment. 
After making the down payment and taking. possession of 
the property petitioners sowed grass, installed a swimming 
pool, and remodeled the main building adding showers, a 
steamroom, and health and exercil'le equipment. They plan to 
make further improvements including additional swimming 
pools and a nine-hole golf ('ourse. 
They have financed these improvements in part by the sale 
of memberships in the country club. To date they have sold 
110 "charter member~hips" for $150 each. They have also 
given ont 60 "honorary rhartel' memberships." They plan 
to ~en a total of 200 "chartl'r lnl'mh.>rships" for $150 each, 
thereby raising $30,000; 300 1\JI'mil('I':-;hips for $200 each, 
thereby raising $60,000, and 500 memberships for $250 each, 
) 
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thereby raisi!lg $75,000. 'I'll<' twi('(' of a. membership is to in-
crease' as additional facilities al'e added to the club. Golf 
memberships are to be offered at a latcr time for an additional 
$200 each. Apart from the pl'itie of a nlPlIlbership a member 
must also pay monthly dues, the amount of which is fixed at 
the time he purchases his membership. 
Both the membership application and the bylaws pl'ovide 
that a member has no rights ill thc income or assets of the club. 
A member and his immediate family, however, havc the right 
to use all of the club facilities except the golf course, for 
which special membership is required. A member cannot be 
expelled except for misbehavior or failure to pay the monthly 
dues. The membership is transferable, but only to persons 
approved by the board of directors of the club. 
The Commissioner of Corporations has cOl1duded that a 
membership interest in the countQ' club is a security and that 
the sale thereof without a permit is prohibited by the Corporate 
Securities Act. (Corp. Code, § 25500.) 1 On September 4, 1959, 
he issued a "Desist and Refrain Order" directing petitioners 
to stop the sale of memberships. After a hearing he denied 
petitioners' motion to vaeate the order. Petitioners then sought 
a writ of mandate in the superior court to compel the com-
missioner to vacate his order. The court granted the writ, and 
the commissioner appeals. 
Section 25008 of the Corporations Code defines a security 
as follows: . 
" • Security' includes all of the following: 
"(a) Any stock, including treasury stock; any certificate 
of interest or participation; any certificate of interest in a 
profit-sharing agreement; any certificate of interest in an oil, 
gas, or mining title or lease; any transferable share, investment 
contract, or beneficial interest in title to property, profits, or 
earnings. 
,. (b) Any bond; any debenture; any collateral trust cer-
tificate; any note; any evidence of indebtedness, whether 
interest-bearing or not. 
" (c) Any guarantee of a security. 
II (d) Any certificate of deposit for a security." 
The commissioner ('outeuns not only that a membership iu 
the club is a b('neficial interest in the title to property and 
l"~O ~ompn"y ~h~ll ~cll allY s(,~l!rity of its own issue ••• or offer 
for ~:oI('. n"l::otiate for the RaJe of. or take Rubs('riptions for any such 
~\J~urity. 11111 il it hilS first npplicrl for and secured from the commis· 
sioner a pcrmit authorizing it 80 to do." 
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therefore a security within the literal language of subdivision 
(a) of section 25008 hut also that the purchase of such an 
interest iR attended by the very risks the corporate securities 
act was designed to minimize. Petitioners contcnd that a 
mcmbership is not a beneficial interest in property, on thc 
ground that a member of the club has no rights in either the 
assets or the income of the club, and that in any evcnt a 
membership is 110t within the scope of the act on the ground 
that it is purchased, not for investment, but for the use and 
enjoyment of the purchaser. 
[1] Section 25008 defines a security broadly to protect the 
public against spurious schemes, however ingeniously devised, 
to attract risk capital. (People v. Syde, 37 Ca1.2d 765, 768 
[235 P.2el 601].) To effectuate this purpose the courts look 
throng-Ii forJll to substalll·C'. (Dom(stic & Foreign Petro Co., 
Ltd. V. Long, 4 Cal.2d 547,555 [51 P.2d 73] ; Oil Lease Set'vice, 
Inc. v. Stephenson, 162 Cal.App.2d 100, 107-108 [327 P.2d 
628] ; S('C 8,'cllrific.' & R.rclWlIgc COli!. V. Howey (lV. J.) Co., 
328 U.S. 293, 298 [66 S.Ct. 1100, 90 L.Ed. 1244, 163 A.L.R. 
1043]; 14 Fletcher, Cyclopcdia of Corporations, pp. 179-180; 
Loss, Securities Regulations, pp. 299-329; Dahlquist, Regula-
tion and Civil LiaMlity Under thc California Corporate Se-
curities Act, 33 Cal.L.Rev.343, 357; 163 A.L.R. 1052-1053.) 
Thus, the sale of fur-bearing animals and the entrusting of 
those animals to the seller for care and disposition of the 
fur (Hollywood State Bank V. Wndc. 70 Ca1.App.2d 103, 107 
[160 P.2d 846]), the selling of "serviees" in procuring United 
States oil leases (Oil Lease Service, Inc. v. Stephenson, supra, 
162 Cal.App.2d 100, 108-113), and th(' sale of orange groves 
coupled witb a contract to have the wndor service the land 
(Srcurifics & Exchange Comn. V. Howcy (W. J.) 00., supra, 
328 U.S. 293, 298) were all held to be sales of securities. 
[2] The purchaser of a IDrmhership in the present case 
has a contractual right to use the club facilities that cannot 
be rcvoked except for his own misbehavior or failure to pay 
dues. Such an irrE'Yocable right qualifies as a beneficial interest 
in title to property within the literal language of subRection 
(a) of section 25008. (See Yuba River Power CO. V. Nevada 
hr. Dist .. 207 raJ. 521. 5~!1: 527 [279 P. 1281 ; C'f. Civ. Cone, 
§ 654; Gov. Code, § 54030.) The erueinl qucstion nrverthe1ess 
remains whether the ~ale of such a JIIemherRhip comeR within 
the regulatory purpose of the Corporate SeC'ul'itiC'R Act. 
[3] It has been held that a cont rae,t proyi(ling only for the 
sale of services is not within the scope and purpose of the 
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act. (People v. Syde, supra, 37 Ca1.2d 765, 769.) In other 
states it has also been held that the sale of memberships in 
an organization in which members have no interest in the 
assets or profits is not a sale of securities. (Hacker v. Gold-
berg, 263 Ill. App. 73, 76; Creasy Corp. v. Enz Bros. Co., 177 
Wis. 49 [187 N.W. 666, 667] ; Lewis v. Creasey Corp., 198 Ky. 
409 [248 S.W. 1046, 1049].) [4] In eontrast" as a general 
rule, the sale of 'securities' that is condemned by the courts 
involves an attempt by au issuer to raise funds for a business 
venture or enterprise; an indiscriminate offering to the public 
at large where the persons solicited are selected at random; 
a passive position on the part of the investor; and the conduct 
of the enterprise by the issuer with other people's money." 
(Dahlquist, Regulation and Ci/Jil Liability Under tlte Cali-
fornia Securities A.ct, supra, 33 Cal.IJ.Rev. 343, 360.) 
We have here nothing like the ordinary sale of a right to 
use existing facilities. Petitioners are soliciting the risk 
capital with which to develop a busiuess for profit. The pur-
chaser's risk is not lessened merely because the interest he 
purchases is labell('d a membership. Only because he risks llis 
('apital along with other pnrehasers can there be any chance 
that the benefits of club membership will materialize. 
[ 5] It bears noting that the aet extends even to trans-
actions where capital is placed without expectation of any 
material benefits. Thus from its exemption of securities of 
errtain nonprofit compallies2 the act specifically excepts 
"notes, bonds, debentnres, or other evidence of indebtedness 
whether interest-bearing or 1/ot." (Italics added.) [6] Sin('(' 
the act does not make profit to the snpplier of capital the test 
of what is a security, it seems aU the more clear that its ob-
jective is to afford those who risk their capital at least a fair 
chan~e of realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures 
whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one 
form or another. [7] Hence the act is as clearly appli. 
cable to the sale of promotional memberships in the present 
case as it wonld be had the purchasers expected their return 
"'Exeept as otherwise expressly provided in this division, the Cor· 
pornte Securities I.aw does not apply to any of the following eloRses 
of securities: 
"(a) Any seeurity (except notes, bonds, debentures, or other evi-
denres of indehteilness. wheth('r int<'rest-bearing or not) issued by a 
company organized unller the laws of this Rtate exelusively for edura-
tional, lJcuevolent, fraternal, t'liaritahl<" or reformatory purposes and 
not for pecuniary profit, 110 part of the !'arnings of whi~h inures to 
t.he h!'nrfit of any private sharcho1t1!'r or individua1." (Corp. Codl'l, 
.25102.) 
) 
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in some such familiar form as dividends. Properly so, for 
otherwise it could too easily be vitiated by inventive substitutes 
for conventional means of raising risk capital. 
The order of the trial court granting petitioners a writ of 
mandate is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment of 
the Superior Court of the City and County'of San Francisco 
(Orla St. Clair, J.), for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice 
Shoemaker in the opinion prepared by him for the District 
Court of Appeal and concurred ill by Mr. Presiding Justice 
Kaufman and Mr. Justice Draper, (Cal.App.) 9 Cal.Rptr. 694. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Respoudents' petition for a rehearing was denied June 14, 
1961. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
